Modernisation and Development

Back in the bad old days, development and modernisation were seen as pretty much synonymous. Becoming developed meant, well, becoming more like the West. These days the two ideas have detached themselves and come to mean different things. To some people, anyway.

One of the interesting things about reading a book like "The Sociology of Modernisation and Development" (by David Harrison) is realising just how wide the gap between economics and other social sciences really is. Sure, economists like Rostow were involved in modernisation theory and economists associated with the Economic Commission to Latin America (ECLA) with dependency theory, the two early schools of thought in development theory. But do economists even realise this?

Economics seems by far the most ahistorical of the social sciences. Sociologists seem to always be looking over their shoulders, seeing where they've come from to work out where they might be going. Trying to read a sociology book or article without some exposure to the background is, in a phrase, not so fun.

Economics is quite different. When taught, economic theory is presented as immutable: it all started with Adam Smith and now is sitting on your table. Homo economicus (rational as he is) has always existed and always will. He determines the course of history and will chart the waters of the future. (If this paragraph seems gender-biased, you must be from one of the softer social sciences.)

While economic reasoning and rationality certainly are important, a neglect of the historical aspect can be dangerous. Sociologists seem far less likely to observe something twice. They know what previous theorists have said, what debates and ground have been covered and don't need to revisit the territory. Economists sometimes seem to run in circles, repeating the same mistakes, particularly in development, ad nauseum.

Take for example, the view of development as "being more like the West". Isn't that just what the Washington Consensus (and post-Washington Consensus) was all about? "This is how the West got rich and this is how everyone else will do it". Well, the West isn't looking so hot right now so perhaps that particular brand of advice will be meted out in smaller doses. But if the US and EU get back on their gargantuan feet anytime soon, it may not be long till its more of the same. Developing countries may want to take advantage of the window while it's still open.

The Networks We Don't See

Moises Naim's book "Illicit" is an eye-opener. A spine-chilling eye-opener. The book surveys the depth to which criminal networks have become embedded in our society. Just as globalisation has opened up the world to all sorts of legal cross-border flows, so too has it opened it up to illegal flows of drugs, arms, sex slaves, you name it.

And these are flows do not originate from the hierarchical mafioso a la "The Godfather". Rather as technology has involved, so too has the organisation of the criminal underworld. Yes, there are still very powerful groups and individuals but they are now organised in a networked way, making them that much harder to detect and crack down on.

Another evolution in the world of crime has been the specialisation in function, rather than a specific type of illicit trade. Drugs, arms, people trafficking are no longer distinct strands; instead they have run together where the same set of traffickers could be smuggling all manner of goods across borders. One of the main reasons why some degree of cognisance has been taken of how out of control contraband trade is the link between terrorists and criminals.

One of the areas most replete with grey areas is that of high-finance. As cross-border flows of contraband have grown, so too has the amount of money that needs laundering. While front businesses may still be part of the process, elaborate layers of financial products are also used making it that much easier to get money clean.

An expected boon may come in the form of the current financial crisis as one of the major groups of beneficiaries of financial deregulation have been the criminals. Certainly, as the book points out government aided and abetted as they sometimes are by civil society groups and big business are woefully losing the battle. Naim points to two reasons for this. First, the structure of law enforcement has not evolved in the dynamic way criminal networks have. Second, too much effort has been placed on the supply-side rather than the demand-side of efforts to curb illicit trade.

And this brings us to the crux of the matter. As Naim points out, it is not the glee of doing something morally questionable that motivates criminals, but profit. And as long as there is demand for the product and gains to be made from getting goods from where they're cheap to where they command a high price, efforts to squash the trafficking of illegal goods will prove ineffectual.

Naim's book combines the easy-to-read style and anecdotal evidence of a journalist to a well-thought through academic argument. He explores the structure of criminal networks and the agencies that work against them, analyses the motivators for illegal trade and how these point to improved strategies for combating it, and also looks at how various political theories may blind policy-makers to the extent of the problem. His book certainly is a wake-up call worth paying attention to.

Governments - What For?

Over the last decade, governments have appeared to play less and less of a role in the decision-making of the world economy. Multinational corporations, and in particular the world's major financial houses, seemed to rule the roost. In the wake of the credit crunch, this perception has been shaken up. Only one of the sinking ships, Merill Lynch, got bailed out by a peer; the remaining survivors have been rescued by the American government.

A decade ago, Linda Weiss made the argument in her book "The Myth of the Powerless State" that governments had a crucial role to play in what she refers to as an "internationalising" (as opposed to a "globalising") world economy. She argued that the reason why people believed that the power of governments was disappearing is that they expected the trappings of a powerful goverment to remain immutable. But, she pointed out, a government alive to the evolution of its economy would instead change its tools of trade over time to ensure that it provided what was most needed to nursemaid the economy through its various stages.

The primary examples of powerful government that she singles out are those of Japan and Germany. With an acute eye for detail, she sifts through the twentieth century history of these global powerhouses to show how their instruments for influencing the economy have been altered as their economies grew. Signs that others have mistaken for a weakening state in these two countries, she reinterprets as the evolution of a state alive to the changing needs of the industries it shepherds. And certainly she makes a convincing argument, both for these economies and the other East Asian tigers that have followed in Japan's footsteps.

Weiss contrasts governments which have been, and remain, involved with their economies to those with a hands-off approach, principally Britain and America. After the failure of Keynesianism in the 1970s, these governments have largely favoured the neoclassical approach which allows the economy to tread its own way through international waters. An approach that the last year of turmoil has shown up as being as flawed as in its previous incarnation, prior to the Great Depression.

Weiss also distances the governments of Germany, Japan and the East Asian Tigers from those of the Scandinavian countries. Generally, the Scandanavian countries are also grouped as having strong governments but Weiss draws an important distinction: like the Anglo-American model, the Scandinavian model views the economy as having consumption as its primary aim and fashioning its policies in this light. Germany, Japan and the newly industrialised Asian tigers instead focus on the production side of the economy and in this way have been able to preserve strong government even as the economy strengthens. Thereby undermining what Weiss sees as a false dichotomy between strong government and strong industry.

Weiss' distinction between consumption-based and production-based economies is an interesting one. And certainly one which she backs up and explains in intriguing detail. What is also interesting is her argument that production-based economies tend to have better consumption-outcomes than consumption-based economies.

Throughout, Weiss' arguments are cogently presented and her knowledge of the cases she discusses is exhaustive. She makes a powerful case for the importance of government in the modern global economy and her emphasis on the role that a government can and should take in its economy is certainly one which policy-makers scraping up the latest financial mess would do well to heed.

Equality - Still In Short Supply

Once upon a time the concept of equality was hardly an important one. Today it is a touchphrase as frequently invoked and as little understood as "sustainable development". Equality is, apparently, something everyone wants and, moreover, it is something that everyone should want and should have. But what exactly is it?

When the hierarchical conception of the world first started to break down, it was largely thanks to liberal philosophers like Locke and Hobbes who posited that people were morally equal. Locke justified moral equality in more religious terms, focusing on the fact that all offspring of Adam were equal and could not be compelled by another to do something. Hobbes justified it in more visceral terms appealing to the fact that as any man could be killed by either the confederacy or guile of others, they must all be equal. He also observed that there was no greater proof that men were equal than that each thought himself better than his peers.

Both of these early liberal philosophers used their conception of moral equality to underpin theories of state power deriving from a social contract. For Locke, men exchanged their autonomy for the protection afforded by the state but they could regain their autonomy if the state failed in keeping up its end of the bargain. For Hobbes, the only way to escape the "nasty, brutish and short" life of the state of nature was to hand over all autonomy to the state, or as he called it "the leviathan" and there was no regaining of that autonomy as any challenge to the leviathan would inevitably return society to the state of nature.

As there is no evidence for either the state of nature or a social contract, hypothetical or otherwise, contractarianism has largely fallen out of favour. Moral equality hasn't and these days the implications of it are considered to be spread far more widely.

But for all equality's allure to the modern mind, its evidence in the world at large is fairly limited. Yes, if one chooses only to focus on western societies, it seems that people's rights at least are equal. Though, if one digs into it, the supposed equality of the genders has not filtered through to "equal pay for equal work", except in a handful of countries, and one has only to peruse the most basic of stats regarding race in American to realise that racial equality is still an elusive goal.

If one looks at the world as a whole, the situation is only bleaker. Though slightly outdated, Bob Sutcliffe's book "100 Ways of Seeing an Unequal World" provides a horrifying look at global data on inequality, no matter which axis one chooses to look at it from. For a South African, perhaps the most compelling are the graphs comparing the Black/White division in South African during Apartheid and the North/South division of the world in the 1990s. Sutcliffe takes the ratios of the human development index, education spending, health spending, infant mortality, life expectancy, industrial wages and income and shows that the division between the north and south is as great, and in some cases greater, that the division between blacks and whites at the height of apartheid.

In a world where moral equality has been enshrined into human rights, how can things have gone so badly wrong? Capitalism and democracy are supposed to be the economic and political systems that best enshrine this idea of moral equality. And yet they fail so badly. Perhaps a Marxist would appeal that the most basic forms of equality is equality of income and the problem with capitalism is that it rewards people unequally. The problem with Marxism is while great in theory, in practice it tends to turn into Maoism or Leninism, which involves the sacrifice of many other forms of equality in order to achieve income equality. And do we really believe that our rights to choices about what we believe, what we do, who we gather with are worth that? Especially considering that capitalism tends to generate higher average incomes anyway.

The problem with capitalism is that while in theory everyone is given the same measure of influence over the economy and so whatever tangible outcome they end up with is a result of their own decisions, in practice people start with such different allocations that the final allocation can't be considered to have been derived solely from their choices. This is the problem with capitalism identified by John Rawls. Rawls agreed that equality of income was itself a weak goal especially if everyone was better off if those with the most to contribute, received the most in return. But he stressed the importance of protecting the most vulnerable in society. He argued that those who ended up as the most vulnerable did so largely because of things they had no control over - the talents they were born with, the social situation of their parents. So why should they be punished and others rewarded for possessing things entirely beyond their own control?

And this really is the problem with the world today - people are primarily punished and rewarded for issues far beyond their control. The child born in Niger has a start on life so dramatically different from that of a child, any child, born in the US or the UK, that any hope of them achieving the same outcomes is almost certainly doomed. And if the child should happen to be female, her chances are even worse.

Income equality is certainly not an end in itself and even equality of opportunity isn't - considering that some people are just born lazy. But a little bit more of both would make a big difference to a lot of people - after all, equality is about each person having the best shot at whatever their perception of "the good" is.

Who Runs the World?

Keynes is widely credited as being the brains behind the economic multinational organisations set up after World War Two. In response to the Great Depression, Keynes had argued for the necessity of government intervention to stabilise the boom and bust cycle of the free market. This held both at a national and an international level. However, when it came time to set up these new institutions, Keynes had less to do with the construction of these entities than he might have wanted.

Richard Peet argues in his book "Unholy Trinity" that the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) were all established on and continue to be driven by a neoclassical influence. The argument that the "Washington Consensus" associated with these organisations is part of a neoclassical agenda is not unique to Peet; what is interesting in his contribution to the literature on this subject is that he traces this neoclassical influence right back to the establishment of these organisations.

In fact, the only thing he identifies as being Keynesian about the organisations is that they are founded on the belief that some kind of government intervention is required in the free market. As others have argued, his book identifies the American government as being the primary agent behind the influence of neoclassicism in these organisations. He goes further and attributes the major financial institutions as being the prime mover behind the American government's espousal of neoclassicism.

The historical argument of the book offers an interesting perspective of how the US government imprinted its influence on the Bretton Woods organisations from their establishment. The world had just come out of a period where the USA had withdrawn from the wider world. Much of the spillover of the Great Depression into the rest of the world was due to this decision. More importantly, the Allies had been staring down the jaws of defeat until the USA had entered the war. The negatives of a US withdrawal from international affairs were only too apparent, so the world was willing to concede the deciding vote in the new organisations in exchange for US involvement.

Peet traces the role of the US government, academic institutions, mutinational financial institutions, particularly investment banks, and press in establishing the hegemonic influence of neoclassicism. Although academic institutions are nominally independent, much of their funding is corporate. Furthermore, economic academics who leave the Ivory Tower, either temporarily or permanently, tend to find a home in government organisations and major financial houses. These same financial houses often own controlling influences over media companies. Peet lays out the academic credentials of the various heads of the two Bretton Woods organisations and it is clear enough that many of them were not only educated at the same institutions but most had worked for investment banks before taking up their positions in these international bodies.

Much emphasis is often laid on the amount of debt owed by poor and middle-income countries to the wealthy ones. But it should not be forgotten that much of these countries' debt are also owed to and traded by major international financial houses. And neoclassical tenets do provide the best guarantee that those debts will be paid as they promote fiscal discipline and the importance of exports. By minimising government spending and maximising export revenues, governments are more likely to be able to pay their debts. However, the other economic effects of such policies are more arguable.

This book does provide interesting insights into how prevailing economic powers use their influence to chart academic discourse. However, what it does neglect is the fact that sometimes this flow goes in both directions. Throughout history, it has often been the thinkers who have envisioned a new way of organising society, both politically and economically, and the rest of society has followed. Even classical theory itself was one of the progenitors of capitalism. There may be feedback effects that serve to entrench theory so as to protect a system once it is established but often it is theory which is the first mover.

As the book mentions, a counter-hegemonic movement has begun in academia and outside of it that opposes the claims of neoclassicism. As the new discourse establishes itself, it too will build a picture of how the world should be organised and should that picture make its way into the real world, it too will spawn interests to feed the theories that brought it into being. One can only hope that the world it builds will be a prettier one for those at the bottom of the pile.

Superheroes Attack!

Superhero movies seem to be one of those things Hollywood can't make enough of. Every couple of years a new set is released, and at the moment, we see to be in the middle of a deluge. Ironman and the Incredible Hulk have just gone off the screens, Hancock has just arrived and The Dark Knight is about to descend. Superhero movies excite the popular imagination. The question is would we actually want them in the real world?

As the movie Hancock draws attention to, superheroes create an enormous amount of damage. And the question is: is the damage worth it? Well, if they're stopping a supervillain bent on destroying the world as we know it, then most probably. In other cases, possibly not. The amount that the bank has to pay to rebuild its building (plus the increase in its insurance premiums) may be more than what the superhero saved them. And, as every economist knows, even a human life may not be worth knocking over most of downtown.

Furthermore, would people want to live or do businesses in city with a local superhero? The periodic destruction of property would send insurance through the roof and who really wants to relocate every time Superman has a spat with Lex Luthor. As everyone knows, superheroes attract supervillains like the plague, so wouldn't you rather lump it in a city with just the regular variety of criminal?

The other thing about superheroes is that they may be very good at making headlines for saving cats stuck in trees and stopping bank robbers, but is this really most efficient way of using their time? Consider Robert Mugabe. Wouldn't it make more sense to send Superman after him (and those of his ilk) rather than having him pansy about stopping car crashes in Metropolis? Superheroes seem to flock to American cities, rather than taking on the thornier, more complex problems in the rest of the world. This is probably because movies only work if there's a clear good and bad side, but if superheroes really existed wouldn't we have wanted them to intervene in the Balkans or the Rwandan genocide?

Updating superhero movies seems to mainly consist of adjusting the settings and giving the science a brush-over based on more recent discoveries. Sometimes the character's are given a bit of a new spin - the previous Pepper Potts in Ironman was even more of a walk-over for her boss; Christian Bale's Batman has a more complex backstory. And, to some extent, the latest set of superhero films nod to broader sensibilities.

Ironman takes a look at the jihadist conflict in which the USA has become embroiled. He gets to see a bit of the world, take in some new sights. However, the chief reason why he gets to do this is exactly because it is one case in which the world's hyperpower has decided to involve itself with the rest of the world. For Tony Sparks, more than most superheroes, this makes sense. He comes across as fairly narcissistic and pragmatic. He may want to improve the world but he's not a pure altruist.

The Incredible Hulk has some incredible scenes set in South America. The cinematography is breathtaking. But the hero isn't there to save the day. He's there to escape. Admittedly, he is doing this because he seems the dangers of there being more like him and, considering the kind of character he comes across as, maybe he would trek back to South America once he gets his powers under control. Certainly, the South Americans probably need him more than their neighbours in the North.

Hancock is a superhero movie with a difference. First of all, no comics preceded it. Second, the superhero, while possessing all the powers of Superman, is not all that interested in solving the world's problems. He does save people but he also has a tendency to give in to criminals holding hostages and cause massive amounts of property damage. The film plays off this well and has an interesting look at how Hancock spruces up his image (there's more to this intriguing film than that but let's leave it there for now). However, when it's time for Hancock to find a new home, it's off to New York he goes. Yes, it's a crime spot but surely Charlize could have told him Jo'burg has bigger problems.

At the end of the day, superhero stories are good entertainment and, when done well, great entertainment. They're enjoyable and not meant to be taken too seriously. However, if they ever do figure out how to make superheroes, either with technology, bioscience or importing them from outer space, then giving them a wide berth might be a good idea.

National Arts Festival

Grahamstown is a small town, defined as a city based on an antiquated English law that says that all a city needs is a cathedral and a university. The university of course is Rhodes, best known for its world-renowned journalism department. The cathedral is also impressive, though not on an international scale. But what Grahamstown is probably best known for is its role as the host of the annual National Arts Festival.

Come the end of June, every available space is transformed into either a miniature theatre or a temporary art gallery. Thespians, and other artists, descend on the town, followed by hordes of South Africans looking for their annual dose of culture. Little white-faced boys appear on every street corner in the guise of mimes. Stalls spring up like weeds and traffic diversions abound, converting two-way streets into one-ways and mystifying the town's residents.

It is impossible to see every show and the publication "Cue" attempts to give guidance, chock full as it is of reviews and feature articles. Unfortunately, the standard of the publication seems somewhat haphazard, with every reviewer having their own way of seeing things, and no attempt at a ratings system is provided. The result is that one has to search through the publication cover-to-cover attempting to choke some help out of this stone. It's better than nothing, but considering the overwhelming array of offerings, it leaves a lot to be desired.

A proposed ratings system could work something like this:
1 Star - Don't Waste Your Money
2 Star - Not a Complete Waste of Money
3 Star - See it, if it's in your Sphere of Interest
4 Star - Recommended
5 Star - It should be Mandatory for all Festival Participants

As a demonstration, six reviews for shows performed this year will be given below:

Wild and Fragrant - 2 Star
Description: A one-woman collage of Herman Charles Bosman's works and life story.
Review: This is not the first Herman Charles Bosman collage in which this actress has performed, but it is not her best either. While the acting is good, if a bit dull as the main character in every story is the same, the selection for this year is poor. Considering the broad range of work left by Bosman, this shows leaves something to be desired. Bosman fans will enjoy the final story in the collage.

Mark Sampson Feels Funny - 3 Star
Description: A one-man comedy show about life's snakes and ladders.
Review: Last time, it was his children that inspired him; this time it is father's death. Unlike most comedy shows, Mark Sampson's contain a story and a message, but this certainly doesn't undermine their humour. While it probably should not have been billed as a family show, people who enjoyed his previous show will not be disappointed.

Australia VS South Africa - 3 Star
Description: Two comedy duos team up to compare and contrast these two great sporting nations.
Review: A delightful and amusing romp, with excellent characters, an entertaining plot and outstanding mime- and sound-work. The only niggle with this show is that if you don't know much about sport, the humour will be lost on you (but then, how many South Africans does that apply to?).

Under the Stars, Above the Tree - 2 Star
Description: A fantastical coming of age tale about a boy climbing to the top of the tree covering the world.
Review: The visual effects for this production are impressive, providing a compelling setting. The concept is original, and the acting is reasonable. The story seems aimed at children, along the lines of Aesop's Fable and other such moral-communicating tales. The problem is that the main character is a boy trying to reach the top of the tree so that his grandfather can die in peace knowing someone has seen the sky, and this is not a convincing motivation for a child. While adults may see the force of going to extreme lengths to allow a suffering relative to die in peace, children are unlikely to appreciate it.

Puck's Story - 4 Star
Description: A one-hour version of "A Midsummer Night's Dream" where the audience follow the story around the vast garden at Crossways.
Review: This is a skilfully-edited and well-crafted version of the Bard's Tale. The use of space, with the audience constantly having to move around the garden with the actors, is excellent. The twin pillars of the story, Puck and Bottom, hold up their ends brilliantly with many of the other actors giving sterling performances. The only problem with this play is that it is being performed in the middle of winter.

Butlers and Brandy - 4 Star
Description: A murder mystery where the audience chooses what happens next.
Review: It's not often the audience gets to decide where the story goes, but that is exactly what happens in this cunning whodunnit. The actors, most of whom take on multiple roles, all compete to be the most loathsome, as the audience decides who to kill off. The butler holds the story together, guiding the audience through the twists, the turns and the votes. All of the acting is top-notch, and the visual and sound effects are delightful.

Prince Caspian - What Went Wrong?

After the highly successful "The Chronicles of Narnia: The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe", it was projected that the sequel "The Chronicles of Narnia: Prince Caspian" would rise to even higher heights. The opening weekend was expected to be huge but fell well short of expectation and since then has been beaten down the box office rankings by both "Iron Man" and "Indiana Jones". This begs the question as to why the film fell so far short of expectation.

In the sequel, the four Pevensie children, who starred in the first movie, return to the world of Narnia to discover it has changed almost beyond compare. Their great castle is now a ruin, they have become figures of legend and the native Narnians have been driven almost to the point of extinction by the ruthless Telmarines. It is one of these Telmarines, Prince Caspian, who has summoned them back to help him claim the throne stolen from him by his Uncle Miraz and reclaim Narnia for its natives.

It is not only Narnia that has changed. The eldest sibling, Peter (played by William Moseley), has struggled to adjust from being "High King Peter the Magnificent" to being plain old Peter Pevensie from Finchley. His rebellious streak is not consistent with C.S. Lewis' novel's portrayal of the character but comes across as far more realistic. After all, it can't be an easy adjustment to make.

Susan (played by Anna Popplewell) has also gotten older and develops a rather annoying crush on Prince Caspian. Like at the beginning of the first movie, she seems ill-at-ease with the magical realm and struggles to settle in. There is a scene between Susan and Lucy that does an excellent job of fore-shadowing the fact that Susan, in later instalments of the series, was the only Pevensie to stop believing in Narnia. Susan also gets to fight alongside her brothers in this one, getting one in for the girls.

Edmund (played by Skandar Keynes) has the strongest role of the four children, though Peter tends to take the limelight. From an insecure young man at the beginning of the previous film, he has really grown into himself. While at one point he describes the fact that he is King Edmund, not Prince Edmund, second to his brother the High King, as "confusing", he seems perfectly comfortable with it. He supports his elder brother while understanding Peter's weaknesses well enough to know when he needs to step in.

Lucy, the youngest, (played by Georgie Henley) is now too old to be cute and too young to be much else. While one of Lewis' favourite characters, she comes off as a bit bland in this film. Having the strongest faith in Aslan, the Christ-figure of the series, she is the one who is entrusted with saving the day, a duty that keeps her out of the way for much of the film.

Prince Caspian (played by Ben Barnes) is the new kid on the block and was cast to be considerably older than his character in the novel. He was also cast to be heartthrob of the film. And he is gorgeous. He ends up being shunted into the background by the Pevensies but this appears to be deliberate on the part of the director. The juxtaposition between the scene where the Narnians pledge their allegiance to him and the one just a little while later where he becomes second (or third) fiddle to Peter is striking. Barnes portrays an introspective character struggling to come to terms with his role in and relationship to Narnia, which is consistent with the Lewis' character despite his age. His accent, though, is a tad odd.

The film's plot is not quite the same as the book but the adjustments are necessary due to the structure of the novel. In the novel, the Pevensies are summoned much later and only arrive near the end of the action. This would not have worked for the movie and the changes are effective. There are some especially poignant pieces in the first of the two main battles in the film that would not have been possible with the book's storyline.

The plot, then, is good. There are memorable one-liners. The character development, particularly the Peter-Caspian and Peter-Edmund dynamics, is strong. Cameos from the red-bearded dwarf, Trumpkin (played by Peter Dinklage), and the blood-thirsty mouse, Reepicheep (voiced by Eddie Izzard), are excellent. Why then has this film not lived up to its predecessor's reputation?

One reason given is that it was released in May, rather than in December like "The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe". However, this explanation is a bit lacking though it points to the deeper problem. Releasing it in May rather than December reflects its positioning as not being a children's film to the same extent as the first movie.

In the first movie, the emotional weight of the story lies with the youngest two siblings, Lucy and Edmund. Lucy discovers the magical world in the wardrobe and Edmund comes to terms with his dark side. In the second, not only are the younger siblings older, but the emotional weight has shifted to their elder siblings and to Caspian. Both Peter and Caspian are making, and struggling with, the transition to manhood. Susan and Caspian are falling in love. Edmund has a number of great moments but we don't see enough of him and Lucy, as mentioned before, gets sent out of the action. Added to this, there is too much violence in the film for younger children and the whole mood of the film is darker and more "savage".

It was marketed as such and this is, to some extent, consistent with Lewis' novel. Keeping a younger Caspian would have helped make the film more child-friendly and prevented the necessity of introducing a love story (I mean, what seventeen-year-old girl wouldn't fall in love with Ben Barnes?). The film ends up being too dark for children, too little love/lust for teens and too magical for adults. This doesn't leave it without a target market: it is a great film for those old enough that the violence is no problem but with enough of a child within to suspend disbelief and enjoy the coming-of-age story. There are plenty of these around and the film should close with respectable numbers, just not quite what the producers would have liked.